[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: DNSEXT WG LAst Call: Dnssec OK bit.
- To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
- Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG LAst Call: Dnssec OK bit.
- From: Mark Kosters <markk@netsol.com>
- Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2000 09:41:27 -0500
- Cc: DNSEXT WG Mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
- Delivery-date: Thu, 30 Nov 2000 07:33:24 -0800
- Envelope-to: namedroppers-data@psg.com
Olafur
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:26:15PM -0500, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
> This draft is on standards track, if you disagree with that please state why
> in your response.
I'm not sure I disagree but am curious for further rationale. In the
latest version of this draft a part of section 3 was rewritten to say:
# More explicitly, DNSSEC-aware nameservers MUST NOT insert SIG, KEY,
# or NXT RRs to authenticate a response as specified in [RFC2535]
# unless the DO bit was set on the request. Security records that match
# an explicit SIG, KEY, NXT, or ANY query, or are part of the zone data
# for an AXFR or IXFR query, are included whether or not the DO bit was
# set.
Why is an ANY query listed along with SIG, KEY, and NXT? SIG, KEY, and NXT
have explicit security context whereas ANY does not. To me, an ANY query
is ambiguious at best should have the OK bit set for a RFC2535 response.
Mark
--
Mark Kosters markk@netsol.com Verisign Applied Research
PGP Key fingerprint = 1A 2A 92 F8 8E D3 47 F9 15 65 80 87 68 13 F6 48
to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.