Re: DS Algorithm selection and SHA1 deprecation

[Chris Thompson <cet1@cus.cam.ac.uk>]

alex@alex.org.uk writes:

> Assuming the malefactor has control over an intervening point in the
> network, can he not just prevent the validator from seeing the fact
> there is an SHA-256 record there in the first place? (man in the
> middle attack - remove the packets and introduce just the
> SHA-1 DS record of his choice). This is my assumption - if I'm
> wrong about that, then clearly you are right in the rest of your
> logic.

How would the MoM sign it? Surely the two DS records are part of the same
RRset, and so signed as a single entity.

-- 
Chris Thompson
Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk

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