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Re: [dnsext] one algorithm number or two
In message <a06240801c5671883dffa@[10.31.200.152]>, Edward Lewis writes:
> The issue of whether to assign just one algorithm number or two
> algorithm numbers for RSA/SHA-2 is a result of there being no unified
> DNS definition. I.e., you can't assume a DNS server fully implements
> RFC 1995, even if it is used to host the global public Internet's
> root zone. The situation is not unique to this draft.
>
> The document describing RSA/SHA-2 could elect to assign one number
> provided the specification require (MUST) compliance with RFC 5011 in
> all implementations (compliant with the new hash).
>
> But my preference is not to tie RSA/SHA-1 to NSEC3. It's known that
> I have been skeptical of NSEC3, to the irritation of a few people.
> There's no need to go into that again, not now and not here. Whether
> my skepticism is warranted or not, I feel that NSEC3 is still too
> immature to assume that it is an essential core element of DNS or
> DNSSEC.
>
> I know a lot of TLDs are planning on NSEC3. But as of today, none
> are publishing their production zones with NSEC3 records. Maybe they
> soon will, but I'm too old school to bet on the future.
>
> I don't like having two separate algorithm numbers. It makes more
> sense to use the one algorithm number route.
>
> But I think having two numbers is a safer bet on the future. Perhaps
> if NSEC3 has a proven track record, we can get by with assigning just
> one number.
We can always go back and assign a NSEC only alias later
if we end up seeing operational problems with the single
assignment.
Mark
--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org
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